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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Executive stock options remain one of the most widely used tools to tie managers’ 
compensation to performance.  The use of stock options in executive compensation has risen 
dramatically over the last decade.  Morgenson (1998) estimates that in 1997, the 200 largest US 
corporations had reserved 13% of their common stock for stock options to their executives.  This 
was up from 7% in 1989.  Hall and Liebman (1998) estimate that the stock options comprised 
40% of CEOs’ total compensation for S&P companies in 1998.  This proportion was only 25% 
in 1992.  In another study, Murphy (1999) estimates that the median cash compensation paid to 
S&P 500 CEOs has more than doubled since 1970 (in 1996-constant dollars), and median total 
realized compensation (including gains from exercising stock options) has nearly quadrupled. 
The shareholders and boards of directors have backed the proliferation of stock based 
compensation believing that these options serve to reduce agency costs and a direct equity 
participation gives managers an incentive to create value and enhance the stock price.   
However, executive stock options are increasingly becoming a concern for the 
shareholders, especially when the performance bar is set too low.  A typical executive stock 
option plan has the strike price set equal to the stock price on the day of the grant and a maturity 
of 10 years (Murphy, 1999).  A growing number of investors claim that such option grants are 
too generous and do not provide sufficient incentive to executives.  Furthermore, there have been 
several instances when firms have re-priced stock options to executives after a dismal stock price 
performance.  A study by Professors Benner, Sundaram and Yermack of NYU Stern Business 
School on options re-pricing found that while only 0.7% of the executives in S&P ExecuComp 
database had their options re-priced in 1992, almost 2.0% of executives had their options re-
priced in 1995.  Such instances of option re-pricing coupled with the fact that many executives 
have made significant gains from exercising stock options in late 1990s has caused the investors 
and shareholder activists to demand that companies set a higher hurdle rate for their managers 
while issuing options.  In response, several firms have started issuing non-traditional stock 
options.  These options differ from the traditional options in one or more ways and the primary 
purpose is to strongly motivate executive officers to achieve outstanding returns for 
stockholders.  Two such non-traditional options that are in vogue include (i) Index options - 
where the strike price moves with a predefined benchmark such as an industry or market wide 
stock index and (ii) Out-of-money stock option - where the strike price is set so that the option is 
out of the money when granted.  There have been some studies on indexed executive stock 
options.  In their paper, published in 1998, Johnson and Tian examine the valuation and incentive 
implications of indexed stock options.  But the research on out-of-money executive stock options 
has been negligible so far.  Our paper makes a start to fill this gap.  
The higher strike price in an out-of-money stock option creates stronger incentives for the 
executives to increase the stock price than a traditional option since the executives receive no 
compensation until the value of the stock exceeds the above-market exercise price.  Thus, 
stockholders will receive significant appreciation in their investment in the company before 
executives can realize any gains on their premium-priced options.  While the concept of out-of-
money options clearly holds appeal for shareholders, it is worth examining to what extent have 
firms embraced the philosophy of setting a higher hurdle rate for managers.  Our paper aims to 
do just that - examine the motives and effectiveness of issuing out-of-money executive stock 
options.   
In our paper, we examine the issuance of out-of-money executive stock options by firms 
over a five-year period from 1996 to 2000.  We examine the frequency of issuance and 
motivation of firms to issue out-of-money stock options to their executives.  We also explore the 
ex-post effects of out-of-money stock option plans – do firms that issue out-of-money stock 
options show superior subsequent stock price performance that reflects the stronger incentives to 
managers?   
Our study can be divided into three main parts.  In the first part, we examine whether the 
incidence of out-of-money options has increased over the period of our study i.e. 1996-2000.  
We look at the characteristics of out-of-money options in terms of the distribution of exercise 
price around the market price and the term to maturity to understand how deep out of the money 
options are being issued.  In the second part of the paper, we study the characteristics of the firms 
that issue out-of-money options to their executives.  We examine if the firms in our sample share 
any common characteristics with respect to size and industry type.  We also attempt to analyze 
the motivation for firms to issue out-of-money options by studying the relationship between 
issuance of out-of-money options and factors such as past stock price performance and stock 
return volatility.  In the final section of the paper, we examine the effects of out-of-money stock 
options by observing the stock price performance of firms subsequent to issuance of such 
options.  We also attempt to quantify the loss in option value to the executives who receive out-
of-money options and examine if they are being compensated by their firms in some other 
manner.   The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes our data.  Section III 
presents the empirical results and Section IV presents the summary. 
 
II.  DATA 
 
The data for our analysis comes from Standard and Poors’ ExecuComp database.  
ExecuComp reports annual compensation data for the top five officers in a sample of 1,500 
firms, including those companies in S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap600.   
We use the ExecuComp database to extract records of all the executives that are granted stock 
options in the five-year period 1996 – 2000.   We obtain 41,934 executive-year observations.  
We then isolate those observations where the exercise price is greater than the stock price at the 
time of the option grant.  This gives us 357 executive-year observations for the period 1996 –
2000. 
 
III.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Part I  
Incidence of out-of-money options 
An examination of data collected reveals that out of a total of 41,934 executive-year 
observations for the period 1996 – 2000, the proportion of out-of-money stock option issuances 
was only 0.9%.  As seen in Table 1, the proportion of out-of-money issuances declined 
dramatically to 0.3% in year 2000 after averaging to around 0.9% for the period 1996 –1999.  
We also look at the number of firms that issued out-of-money stock options over the period 
1996-2000.  We find that, as indicated in Table 1, the number has progressively declined from 
year 1996 to year 2000, with a dramatic drop in year 2000.   
 
Table 1: Incidence of out-of-money stock options from year 1996 to year 2000 
 Total executive-
year observations 
Percentage of out-of-money 
observations  
# of firms issuing out of 
money stock options 
1996 8677 1.0% 43 
1997 9119 1.1% 44 
1998 9478 0.7% 31 
1999 8447 1.0% 33 
2000 6213 0.3% 8 
Total 41934 0.9% 159 
 
One possible explanation for the sudden drop in issuance of out-of-money options in year 
2000 could be that beginning March 2000, there was a widespread expectation of a sizeable 
decline in stock market over the medium term.  This could have reduced the motivation for firms 
to issue out-of-money stock options lest these options create ‘negative incentives’ for their 
managers in a period of falling stock prices.   
We also examine how frequently do firms issue out-of-money stock options to their 
executives.  Our analysis reveals that out of a sample of firms that have issued out-of-money 
stock options over 1996-2000 period, 71% of the firms have issued these options only once.  
Only 4% of the firms have issued these options in four out of the five-year period under study.  
This suggests that issuance of out-of-money option is a one-time phenomenon for a majority of 
firms rather than part of a consistent compensation plan.    
 
How deep are the out-of-money stock options? 
Out-of-money options have their exercise price set higher than the stock price at time of 
the grant.  Figure 1 in the appendix describes the distribution of the exercise price around the 
stock price at grant. The mean and median of the distribution is 13.7% and 23.1% respectively.  
Figure 1 indicates that in 46% of the cases, the exercise price exceeded the stock price by less 
than 10%.  In 78% of the cases, the exercise price exceeded the stock price by less than 30%.  An 
analysis of the maturity of the out-of-money options reveals that around 50% of the out-of-
money options had a maturity of 10 years.  The mean maturity was 8.2 years while the median 
was 10 years.  This analysis indicates that the options are not very deep out-of-the-money, which 
leads us to suspect their effectiveness in extracting superior performances from the executives 
who receive these options.  It may be possible to explore the linkage between the premium over 
stock price in an out-of-money option and the average long-term equity returns for the industry 
in which the firm operates.  However, we have not covered that analysis in this paper.  
 
Part II 
Characteristics of firms that issue out-of-money options 
In this section, we examine if the firms that issue out-of-money options share any 
common characteristics.  Our data indicates that there is no significant relationship between the 
size of the firm and issuance of out-of-the-money stock option grants to executives.  Over our 
sample period, around 0.8% of executives in S&P 500 firms had out-of-money options issued to 
them.  For the S&P MidCap 400 firms, only 0.4% of executives had out-of-money option grants 
and roughly 0.9% of executives of S&P SmallCap 600 firms had out-of-money option grants.  
We could not identify any industry wide characteristics across firms that issued out-of-money 
options in the period 1996-2000.  The firms belong to diverse industry groups that include both 
human capital intensive industries such as financial services, media, information technology and 
health care as well as those industries that are not human capital intensive such as steel, oil & 
gas, chemicals and manufacturing sector.   
 
Historic share price performance and issuance of out-of-money stock options by firms 
We study the historic share price performance of firms that issued out-of-money stock 
options in order to see if poor stock price performance was the motivating factor for the firms to 
issue such options to their managers.  As indicated in Figure 2, there appears to be no significant 
relationship between the 3-year raw returns to the shareholders and issuance of out-of-money 
options.  Using executive-year as unit of observations, we that that across all firms with 3-year 
stock return of –30% or less, 1.7% of the executives had been issued out-of-money option grants.  
This is the highest frequency seen in the distribution.  This makes intuitive sense since the firms 
with poor share price performance are more likely to issue out-of-money options to their 
executives to induce them to perform better in the future.  However, the relationship breaks 
down for the rest of the distribution; the frequency of out-of-money option grants to executives 
remains more or less constant at 0.9% irrespective of the 3-year stock price performance by 
firms.  This may suggest that only when the past stock price performance is very disappointing 
i.e. raw returns less than -30% over the past 3 years, firms tend to hold the executives 
accountable for the performance and offer out-of-money options instead of at-the-money options.  
We performed a regression analysis between the premium of exercise price over the stock 
price at the time of option grant and the 3-year stock price performance of firms that issue out-
of-money stock options.  Table 2 presents the summary of our regression analysis.   
 
Table 2: Regression Analysis: Premium over stock price vs. 3-year stock price performance 
The regression equation is
PREMIUM % = 25.8 - 0.135 TRS3YR
Predictor Coef SE Coef t p
Constant 0.25791 0.01479 17.43 0.000
TRS3YR -0.0013472 0.0003850 -3.50 0.001
S = 0.2482 R-Sq = 3.6% R-Sq(adj) = 3.3% 
 
Our regression analysis indicates that there is a negative relationship between the 
premium over stock price at the time of option grant and the preceding 3-year share price 
performance i.e. higher the 3-year share price performance of firms, lower is the premium.  This 
result makes intuitive sense since a good 3-year track record in share price performance reduces 
the need for firms to put a higher bar for performance for its executives.   
 
Share return volatility and issuance of out-of-money stock options by firms 
Out-of-money options have a lower value than a traditional option at the time of grant.  
We examine if the firms that issue out-of-money options have exhibited high stock return 
volatility in the past - a higher stock return volatility would offset to some extent the lower 
option value thus lowering the loss in compensation to the executives.  Using firm-year 
observations, we compare the mean and median of stock return volatility of firms that issue out-
of-money stock options to that of firms that issue stock options.  We do this exercise for each 
year in our period of study i.e. 1996 – 2000.  The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3.   
 
Table 3: Comparison of stock return volatility  
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Mean stock return volatility      
Firms that issued out of money options 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.46 0.56
All firms 0.34 0.35 0.40 0.43 0.47
      
Median stock return volatility      
Firms that issued out of money options 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.44 0.49
All firms 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.41
 
We observe that, with the exception of year 1998, in every other year the mean and 
median of stock return volatility of firms that issue out-of-money options is greater than that of 
all firms that issue stock options.  This suggests that the firms with higher share price volatility 
tend to issue out-of-money stock options.  As far as the executives in these firms are concerned, 
the higher stock return volatility offsets partly the loss in option value to them thus decreasing 
the incentive to show a superior performance.  
Part III 
Impact of out-of-money options on firms’ share price performance 
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of out-of-money options as an incentive tool 
- do the firms that issue such options exhibit a superior share price performance that reflects the 
stronger incentives to their executives?  We study the 1-year stock price performance of firms 
both prior to and subsequent to issuance of out-of-money stock options.  A study of a sample of 
110 firm-year observations reveals that in 60% of the cases, firms reported a worse 1-year 
subsequent share price performance as compared to 1-year prior performance.  This suggests that 
the issue of out-of-money stock options has not improved the absolute share price performance 
over a one-year period.  We also looked at the relative share price performance of the firms with 
respect to S&P 500 one-year subsequent to issuing out-of-money options.  We observe that 36% 
of the firms that issued out-of-money options out-performed S&P 500 over a one-year period, 
while 64% of the firms under-performed S&P 500.  The complete distribution is given in Figure 
3.   Again, we conclude that the issuance of out-of-money stock options has not resulted in any 
superior stock price performance by firms.  As seen earlier, the options are not significantly out 
of money so as to goad the executives to perform better.  Further, the higher stock return 
volatility of firms that issue out-of-money options offset partly the loss in option value to 
executives.  This could explain the lack of impact on subsequent share price performance of 
firms.   
 
Are executives really incurring a loss? 
To take the above conclusion further, we study closely the total compensation of the 
executives that are issued out-of-money options.  We analyze the change in total compensation 
of the executives in the year they are issued out-of-money options.  Our analysis indicates that 
over 53% of the executives with out-of-money option grants had their total compensation 
increase over previous year by more than 30%.  (Total compensation data is taken from 
ExecuComp database and is inclusive of option grants).  Figure 4 gives the complete distribution.  
This suggests that in several cases, the firms compensate the executives for the loss in option 
value by increasing their overall package.    
We attempt to quantify the loss in option value to executives and examine if the loss is 
significant enough to drive the executives in delivering improved performance.  We define the 
loss in value as the difference in value between an out-of-money option and an equivalent at-the-
money option.  Here we are making a simplistic assumption that the firms, in normal course, 
would have given equivalent at-the-money options to their executives instead of out-of-money 
option.  We use Black-Scholes option pricing model to value the options and derive inputs for 
our calculation from the ExecuComp database.    
As an aside, we would like to highlight a concern here of using risk-neutral pricing 
techniques.  The Black-Scholes option pricing model involves an implicit assumption of 
hedgeability of the option using the underlying stock.  This may be reasonably assumed to hold 
for shareholders, so option values obtained this way may provide a useful approximation of the 
cost of the option to shareholders.  Employees, however, usually face restrictions in both selling 
their options and shorting the stock of their firms, but it is not quite clear how significant these 
restrictions are in aggregate.  For example, employees who own the company’s stock can create 
the required hedge by selling a part of these holdings, or use index options or other derivative-
based strategies to eliminate part of the risk in options held.  In any event, there is no one 
accepted way of identifying option value to the employee.  The risk-neutral value offers a useful 
benchmark in this case and this methodology has also been used in analysis of similar settings in 
the past [for example, valuation of restricted stock grants in Longstaff (1995) or the valuation of 
non-standard compensation contracts in Johnson and Tian (1999)] 
Our analysis indicates that around 70% of the executives that are issued out-of-money 
options incur a loss in compensation of 10% or less.  Figure 5 gives the complete distribution.  
Thus, the loss in value to executives in a majority of cases does not appear to be large.  Hence, 
though firms seemingly are taking the right step in giving out-of-money stock options to their 
executives, the loss in option value to the executives is not significant.  On top of that, firms 
increase the overall compensation of executives much more than the loss in option value, which 
completely reduces the effectiveness of out-of-money options in setting a higher hurdle rate for 
the executives.  
 
Corporate governance issues 
Our analysis shows that firms issue out-of-money options largely to senior management.  
Around 30% of the out-of-money options were issued to CEOs and 6% to Chairmen of firms.  
For the firms that issued out-of-money stock options over the period 1996-2000, we examined 
corporate governance issues such as separation of the jobs of CEO and Chairman, and the 
inclusion of the CEO in the compensation committee, to see if these variables affect the issuance 
of out-of-money options and the premium over stock price in an out-of-money option grant.  
However, we could not detect any significant relationship. 
 
IV.  SUMMARY 
 
In this study, we explore the issuance of out-of-money executive stock options by firms 
and examine their effectiveness as a tool to extract superior performance by the managers.  Using 
a large sample of U.S. firms over the 1996-2000 period, we obtain results that show that issuance 
of out-of-money stock options by firms is not serving the purpose it is intended to.  The share 
price performance of a majority of firms that issue these options does not improve, both on an 
absolute and relative basis, 1-year subsequent to issuance of the options.  There seem to be 
several reasons for this.   
First, the options are not significantly out of the money so as to drive the managers to 
perform better.  A typical out-of-money option can be described as having a maturity of 10 years 
and the strike price at 23% premium to the stock price at the time of the grant.  Second, using 
simplistic assumptions, we find that the loss in compensation to executives is less than 10% in a 
majority of cases.  The loss in option value is more than offset by an increase in overall 
compensation to the executives.  Around 53% of executives that received out-of-money stock 
options saw an increase in their total compensation by more than 30%.  The loss is also offset by 
a higher than average stock return volatility of firms that issue such options.  Furthermore, the 
issuance of such options for many of the firms seems to be a one-time exercise rather than part of 
a consistent compensation plan.   
Except for exhibiting a high stock return volatility, the firms that issue out-of-money 
stock options do not seem to possess any common set of characteristics in terms of size and 
industry type.  We could not detect any significant relationship between the size of the firm and 
the issuance of out-of-money stock options and the firms that issue such options belong to a 
diverse set of industries.  The relationship between 3-yr prior stock price performance and 
issuance of out-of-money executive stock options is also weak.   
 
APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of exercise price around the stock price at the time of grant 
The distribution of exercise price around the stock price at the time of grant, for a sample 357 observations where 
executives receive out-of-money stock option grants over the period 1996-2000.  Data is taken from ExecuComp 
database using executive-year as a unit of observation.   
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Figure 2: Firm performance and issuance of out-of-money options  
The data is taken from ExecuComp database.  The sample includes 41,934 executive-year observations for the 
period 1996-2000, for which the executives have nonzero holdings of stock options and the database includes a 
three-year cumulative stock return for the company.   The stock return includes the year during which the out-of-
money option is granted. 
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Figure 3: Relative firm performance one-year subsequent to issuing out-of-money options 
The sample includes ex-post share price performance data of 110 firms that issued out-of-money stock options over 
the period 1996-2000.  The sample is drawn from Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database.  The share price data for 
the firms and S&P 500 was collected from Bloomberg. 
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Figure 4: Change in executive compensation levels 
The data is taken from ExecuComp database using executive-year as a unit of observation.  We obtained the total 
compensation data for 306 executives that receive out-of-money stock option grants over the period 1996-2000.   
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Figure 5: Loss in executive compensation due to issuance of out-of-money options 
We use a sample of 306 executives that receive out-of-money stock option grants over the period 1996-2000.  The 
data is taken from ExecuComp database using executive-year as a unit of observation.  We calculated the value of 
out-of-money stock options and value of an equivalent at-the-money options using Black-Scholes option valuation 
model.  The inputs for option valuation such as stock return volatility, dividend yield, maturity, strike price and 
exercise price were obtained from the ExecuComp database.   
 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
0% to 10% 10% to 20% 20% to 30% > 30%
Loss in option value to total compensation
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 e
xe
cu
tiv
es
 w
ith
 
ou
t-
of
-m
on
ey
 o
pt
io
ns
 
 
References: 
 
1. Brenner, M., R.Sundaram, and Yermack, D., 1998, Altering the terms of executive stock 
options, Journal of Financial Economics 
2. Carpenter, J., 1997, The exercise and valuation of executive stock options, Journal of 
Financial Economics 
3. Hall, B.J., Liebman, J.B., 1998, Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
4. Jensen, M.C., Murphy, K.J., 1990, Performance pay and top management incentives, Journal 
of Political Economy 
5. Johnson, S. and Tian, Y. 1998, Indexed executives stock options, Journal of Financial 
Economics 
6. Johnson, S. and Tian, Y. 1999, The value and incentive effects of nontraditional executive 
stock option plans, Journal of Financial Economics 
7. Morgenson, Gretchen, 1998, Stock options are not a free lunch, Forbes, May 18 
8. Murphy, K.J. (1999) Executive Compensation, in Handbook of Labor Economics Vol III, 
(Eds: O. Ashenfelter and D. Card), North Holland 
9. Saly, P.J., 1994, Repricing executive stock options in a down market, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 
10. Yermack, D., 1995, Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively? Journal of 
Financial Economics 
11. Yermack, D., 1997, Good Timing: CEO stock option awards and company news 
announcements, Journal of Finance 
